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9In Italy this happened simultaneously with the decline of the two
main political parties (the Christian Democratic and the Socialist ones) due
to bribes and corruption charges, in a quite novel but effective activity by
the judiciary in order to make politics cleaner.
The regional political parties became essential in forming local
governments in the northern regions and fluctuated between federalism and
separatism. They stressed the inefficiencies of the central government and
the excessive (in their opinion) transfer of funds from the North to the
South. Another hot point they made was the centralisation in rules and
bylaws: everything was decided in Rome, in the same way for every part of
Italy. The examples of Germany and Switzerland – with large autonomies
given to any land and canton – were taken as possible solutions for Italy too.
The mere administrative and operational decentralisation was not
any more enough.
No political party could neglect this appeal to federalism and
decentralisation. The Northern regions make up about 40 % of the
population – and votes – and much more of the GDP – and taxes.
The result was a rather deep change in the Costituzione giving
regions (but not provinces and municipalities) much wider powers. The shift
was essentially from a positive list to a negative list: while previously
regions could legislate on a given number of problems now they can decide
on everything that is not excluded and reserved to the central government.
4 – Decentralisation and Devolution in the Nineties
The reform implemented in the nineties has radically reshaped the
finance of both Regions and Municipalities. Here we focus on Regions as
they represent at present the main counterpart of the central government in
the political debate on fiscal federalism.
4.1 – The Enlargement of the Fiscal Autonomy of Ordinary Statute Regions
At the beginning of the Nineties Ordinary Statute Regions (OSR)
have basically no fiscal autonomy. Up to 98% of total revenue are transfers
from the central government. Further, nearly all of these grants are
conditioned to the financing of the National Health Service (NHS) (which
represents nearly 80% of total regional expenditure) and of other minor
expenditure programs.
During the decade there have been several attempts to increase the
fiscal autonomy of OSR. We can single out two phases in the reform
process. In the first phase, the central government introduces the essential
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instruments for fiscal autonomy through the devolution of relevant taxes to
the OSR.
In 1993, Regions receive the yield of the health pay-roll tax, levied
on salaries and on self-employed incomes. As a consequence transfers drop
to 54% of total revenue. In 1998, the health payroll tax and some minor
regional taxes are abolished and replaced by a new tax, named Irap
(Regional business tax), and by a regional surcharge (0.5%) on the personal
income tax. Irap is a value-added tax implemented through the subtraction
method and levied on basically all business, both in the production of goods
and services and in the financial sector. The base rate is 4.25%. The tax
operates under the origin principle of taxation: the yield accrues to the
Region where the value added is produced. 1 The actual Irap yield has been
far lower than government’s estimates (29 billions against the expected 34
billions of Euro). This explains why own revenues as a share of total
regional revenues drop from 50% in 1997 to 44% in 1998.
In practice, this first phase of reforms has a small, if any, effect on
Regions’ fiscal autonomy. As to the health payroll tax, Regions have no
control upon either the base or the collection procedures. They just receive
the tax yield from the central government Treasury accounts as a part of a
conditional grant, equal to each Region’s health need. Actually, Regions do
have the power to change the tax rate, in a given range around the base rate,
but regional politicians have no incentive to propose unpopular tax increases
given that health financing is secured by government transfers.
This state of affairs is only partially affected by the introduction of
Irap. In theory, Regions have wide powers upon collection and auditing but,
in fact, regional administrations lack the technical skills to manage any of
the procedures involved and passively rely on the central government. As a
consequence, all the information from the tax returns is in the hands of the
Treasury, and is released quite parsimoniously in order to curb the call for
greater political autonomy that comes from the Northern Regions. As to the
tax rates, the 1998 reform confirms the right of the Regions to increase or
reduce them2 but it does not remove the disincentives to fiscal effort. On the
one hand, the entire revenue from the personal tax surcharge and 90% of the
Irap yield are still conditional to health financing. On the other hand, any
gap between Regions’ own revenue and health expenditure is filled by
grants from the central government.
The second phase of the reforms, completed in March 2000, aims at
introducing the right incentives to encourage active tax policies. As
previously remarked, it was widely acknowledged that regional politicians
                                                
1 The total value added of a firm is apportioned to Regions where the production
plants are located on the basis of labour cost.
2 The Irap tax rate can be increased or reduced by one percentage point, the
regional surcharge on the personal income tax by 0.5 percentage points.
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had no incentive to manage the taxes assigned to them for two reasons.
First, they faced a soft budget constraint, as any deficit in the health sector
was ex-post financed through State transfers. Second, almost all revenues
were conditional to health financing.
Furthermore, the Regions claimed that the uncertainty surrounding
the amount of transfers (recall that the transfers were discretionary
determined by the central government, year by year, in the budget law)
hindered any serious financial planning.
The 2000 reform tackles these issues by abolishing almost all
existing grants and replacing them through the sharing of national VAT and
the increase of the base rate of some other minor surcharges (personal
income tax, excise on gasoline). The VAT sharing rate is fixed at 38,55% in
order to leave unchanged the total amount of resources in regional budgets.
The VAT is apportioned to Regions in proportion of the estimated
consumption of their residents. Clearly, the distribution of the abolished
grants is different from that of consumption. Therefore the substitution of
the grants with the VAT sharing generates large fiscal imbalances in almost
every Region. To correct these imbalances the reform draws a new system
of equalisation transfers. In the first year (2001) the transfers simply
redistribute regional resource in order to guarantee at each single Region the
same resources it would have received from the old grants. After a long
transition period, which will end in 2013, the new system of transfers will
equalise resource across Regions according to a formula that takes into
account fiscal capacity and health needs. In theory, the equalising transfers
are horizontal: “rich” Regions give up some of their revenue to finance
“poor” Regions.
Overall, the new system of regional finance should guarantee a hard
budget constraint, as the central government does not finance anymore the
Regions through discretionary transfers. Furthermore, in order to strengthen
the incentives to autonomous tax effort, the reform abolished every
constraint to the use of revenue: the additional yield generated by an
autonomous tax increase can be spent freely to finance any regional
expenditure programs.
Through the abolition of discretionary transfers, the new system of
finance allows a normal financial planning as each Region can estimate
future revenues, that depend on the dynamics of the tax bases and on the
equalising formula.
4.2 – Equalising Transfers
As previously highlighted, the 2000 reform draws a long transition
period from the present system of equalising transfers (which basically
redistributes the regional VAT in order to meet historical expenditure in
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each Region) to a new system where the transfers are determined according
to a formula that takes into account the fiscal capacity, the health need and
the economies of scale in the provision of public services. In particular, at
the end of the transition period, the transfer to Region i, Ti, will be
determined as the difference between the amount of VAT assigned
according to an equalising formula (EVAT) and the VAT assigned to the
Region on the basis of the estimated consumption of Region’s residents
(CVAT). Formally:
Ti = EVATi – CVATi (1)
and
( )
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
÷
ø
öç
è
æ -+÷
ø
öç
è
æ -+-+= å
å p
pggbbn
RVATnEVAT ihihijjj j
i
i
ii gtb
(2)
where ni is Region’s i population, RVAT is the regional share of national
VAT, jt  is the base rate for regional tax j, bij is the base of regional tax j in
Region i, jb  is the average base of tax j over all OSR, ghi is the expenditure
required to meet the health need of Region i, g  is the average expenditure
to meet the overall health need of the OSR, pi is an estimate of the standard
expenditure but for health in Region i and p  is the average of the pi among
the OSR. All variables inside the square brackets are in per-capita terms.
The parameters b and g are equal to 0,9 and 0,7 respectively.
By substituting (2) into (1) we get:
Ti =
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This formula highlights the three criteria that determine the size of
the transfer received or paid by Region i.
The first two terms equalise fiscal capacity among Regions, the third
redistributes resources according to the health need and the fourth corrects
the distribution of resources in order to compensate smaller Regions that
cannot fully exploit economies of scale in the provision of their services.
To evaluate the final impact of the equalisation formula on the
distribution of revenues among Regions it is expedient to consider each of
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the three corrections separately. Assume that Region i keeps its tax rates at
base levels. The Region’s own revenues are equal to
Ri =ni bij
j
jåt + CVATi.
If the region receives (or pays) a transfer, T1i, truncated to the first
two terms in (3), total revenues are:
Gi
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If b were equal to 1 each Region would have total per-capita
regional revenue equal to the average per-capita yield of the VAT sharing
and of regional taxes (e.g. Irap, regional surcharge on personal income tax)
when levied at the base rates. In fact fiscal capacity is completely equalised
only with respect to VAT, while the differences in all remaining regional
revenue are equalised up to 90%, as b=0,9.
In order to describe the effect of the third component of (3) on
regional total revenue it is convenient to rewrite equation (4) taking into
account that the VAT sharing rate has been chosen in order to leave the total
amount of resources that flows in regional budgets unchanged. Therefore, in
the year when the reform is first implemented (2001), the following equality
holds:
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In fact, as we will clarify in section 5.1, the reform is based on the
implicit assumption that this condition will be nearly met also in subsequent
years. We may therefore substitute (5) into (4) to get:
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When we add the transfers generated by the corrections for health
need, total revenue becomes:
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Were b=1 any Region would receive, at base rates, revenue equal to
its health need plus the average per-capita expenditure of all OSR in
programs different from health.
Finally, by adding the fourth component, we get:
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Were b=g=1, each Region would receive, at base rates, the money
needed to finance its health need and standard expenditure in other
programs. In fact, being b and g smaller than 1, some Regions, the ones with
tax bases and population larger than average, would enjoy revenue in excess
of the amount required to cover health need and standard expenditure, while
others, the ones with tax bases and population smaller than average, could
not finance health need and standard expenditure at base rates.
In order to illustrate the impact of the transfers on the distribution of
Regions’ revenue we simulated the implementation of the new transfer
system based on formula (3) in the year 2001. The results are reported in
tables 1 and 2.
Table 1 contains data on the interregional transfers. The values in
per-capita terms show that the sign and the size of the transfers are mainly
driven by the fiscal capacity component due to the large divergence in tax
bases across Regions. All Northern Regions, with tax bases larger than
average, must give up some of their revenue, while all Southern Regions
receive a positive integration to their own resources. The situation of the
Regions in the middle of the peninsula is somewhat mixed: roughly, large
Regions (like Emilia R. and Lazio) are contributors while small ones (like
Marche and Umbria) are beneficiaries. The transfers activated by the
correction for health need are in general smaller and they flow in quite
different directions. The Southern Regions are now mainly contributors as
their health need is lower than average due to a younger population. The
main beneficiaries appear to be the Central Regions and Liguria, which is
the Region with the higher percentage of aged people in population. The last
term in the equalisation formula benefits the small Regions (Liguria,
Marche, Umbria, Molise, Basilicata) irrespective of their geographic
location.
In absolute terms, the total amount of money transferred from “rich”
to “poor” Regions amount to 6,326 millions of Euro (10% of OSR total
revenue). The flows are extremely polarised: the largest Northern Region,
Lombardia, pays out more than half of total contributions and the two
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largest Regions of the South, Campania and Puglia, receive nearly 60% of
all positive transfers.
Table 2 and figure 1, show the effects of the implementation of the
equalisation formula on the distribution of resources among Regions. In
particular columns 3 and 6 of table 2 reports the percentage deviations from
mean of Regions’ total revenue in per-capita terms, respectively in the
actual situation and in the simulated case where the equalisation formula is
implemented in 2001. It is apparent that the equalisation formula mainly
benefits the small Regions that experience an increase of their revenue in
per-capita terms. Surprisingly, the largest Southern Regions are worst off,
despite they are the main recipient of transfers. This is the final result of the
combined effect of partial equalisation of fiscal capacity (b<1), and
relatively low health need (as their population is younger than the Italian
average). Apart from the small Regions, the new transfer system brings
about a strong equalisation of resources, as the divergences from the mean
are smaller than 10%.
5 – Open Issues and Perspectives
5.1 – The Uniformity of Health Standards Across the Country
As previously remarked, one of the main innovations of the 2000
reform is the abolition of any constraint on the use of regional revenue.
Even if the transfer received or paid by each Region is calculated with
reference to its health need gi, the Region may well spend less or more than
gi in health. However, the reform confirmed the principle of the uniformity
of health services provision through the national territory. In fact, Regions
are compelled to provide health services up to specified levels, both in terms
of quality and quantity. If effective, the control of the performances may
provide additional incentives to efficient management of health expenditure.
The more efficient Regions, that are able to meet the required standards at a
cost lower than gi may employ the money they have saved to finance other
expenditure programs according to the needs and preferences of their
constituencies.
Nevertheless the principle of uniformity in health services may be at
odds with the new system of regional finance. As explained in sections 4.1,
the 2000 reform has formally abolished all vertical transfers from the central
budget to the OSR. As a consequence, the Regions should now face a hard
budget constraint as their total revenue, at base rates, depend on the
evolution of their tax bases only. In the year when the reform was first
implemented (2001), the VAT sharing rate has been chosen according to (5)
in order to guarantee sufficient resources to finance the sum of all Regions’
